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ABSTRACT 
 
Hybrid Courts are the latest innovation in the prosecution of international crimes after 
the era of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Examples include; 
the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Regulation 64 
Panels in the courts of Kosovo and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The hybrid 
court model at its inception was believed to be the panacea for the short comings of 
purely international tribunals. The characteristic location of the tribunals in the locus 
of the atrocities and the participation of local judicial officers alongside their 
international counterparts was expected to promote legitimacy and foster capacity 
building for conflict ravaged transitional states.  
Despite the criticisms of the model today, a new hybrid court has recently been 
inaugurated to prosecute Hissène Habré the former President of Chad, for 
international crimes committed during his presidency. The promulgation of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Senegal suggests that the model continues to 
be useful, especially for Africa. This is of particular significance since international 
criminal justice has lately come under attack on the continent. The on-going feud 
between the African Union and the International Criminal court is only the most 
prolific example of this.  
This research paper explores the dimensions of the challenges facing the legitimacy of 
international criminal justice in Africa and the extent to which the hybrid court model 
can provide a solution for them. In order to do so, the study begins by addressing the 
meaning of legitimacy within the African context. A general discussion of hybrid 
tribunals, as well as the specific manifestations of the model in Africa so far, follows. 
The   Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary African Chambers in the 
Courts of Senegal are distinguishable from each other in structure and are thus 
juxtaposed in order to illuminate possible improvements on the hybrid court model 
for the future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Recent events suggest that international criminal justice is in crisis in Africa. On 12 of 
October 2013, the African Union held a special session to evaluate its relationship 
with the International Criminal Court (ICC) resulting in a decision, inter alia, 
asserting the immunity of sitting heads of state from prosecution by the Court.
1
This 
provision potentially contradicts one of the most pivotal principles of international 
criminal justice; that the criminal accountability of individuals for international 
crimes arises regardless of their official position within a sovereign state.
2
The 
decision follows a theme of discord between the African Union and the ICC that 
began with the Court’s issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al 
Bashir,
3
 and which has now peaked with the prosecution of the President and Deputy 
President of Kenya before the Court.
4
This downward spiral has called into question 
the legitimacy of the ICC’s intervention in Africa given that Africa seems to be the 
                                                          
1
Para 10(i) of the Decision of the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec October 2013 available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Ext%20Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20&%20Decl%20_E.pdf 
(accessed 26 October 2013). 
2
House of Lords: Regina v.Bartle/Evans, ex parte Pinochet Judgment of 26 March 1999,38 ILM(1999), 
paras. 581-663 which opened the gates to the indictment and prosecution of several leading 
perpetrators of international crimes such as Slobodan Milosevic, Jean Kambanda and most recently 
Charles Taylor. 
3
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Omar Al Bashir) Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Public Redacted Version, ICC-02/05-01/09, 
(4 March 2009) available at www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf(accessed 26 October 
2013),The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Second Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ICC-02/05-01/09 (12 July 2010) available at www.icc-cpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc907142.pdf (accessed 26 October 2013) (hereafter jointly referred to as Bashir arrest 
warrants). 
4
The Republic of Kenya, The Prosecutor v.Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11 available at 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200109/related%20case
s/icc01090211/Pages/icc01090111.aspx (accessed 26 October 2013),The Republic of Kenya, The 
Prosecutor v.William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang ICC-01/09-01/11 available at 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200109/related%20case
s/icc01090111/Pages/icc01090111.aspx accessed (26 October 2013) (herein after referred to jointly as 
Kenyatta and Ruto cases). 
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sole focus of the Court’s investigations and prosecutions. The prosecution of only 
Africans by the Court so far has given rise to the allegation by some African leaders 
that the Court is ‘witch-hunting’ Africans, and has caused sympathies to shift away 
from the Court to the perpetrators instead as has been suggested by Kenya.
5
 
Even before this impasse with the ICC, the questionable legacy of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) called into question the utility of international 
criminal justice. Especially when contrasted with the success (or at the very least 
efficiency) of the domestic prosecution of genocide in Rwanda by the national and 
Gacaca courts. 
The extensive criticism of the ICTR in fact spawned the idea for a new kind of court 
that was neither domestic nor international but an amalgamation of the best features 
of both. The hybrid court model at its inception was believed to be the panacea for the 
short comings of purely international tribunals. The characteristic location of the 
tribunals in the locus of the atrocities and the participation of local judicial officers 
would promote legitimacy and foster capacity building for the conflict ravaged 
transitional states. Hybrid courts would also promote the perpetration of rule of law 
norms.
6
Unfortunately upon closer scrutiny hybrid tribunals have been intensely 
criticised as well.
7
 The ambitions of the proponents of the hybrid court model have 
since been exposed as idealistic. Hybrid courts are institutions that were often set up 
hurriedly and haphazardly to provide an immediate accountability mechanism. They 
were primarily focused on putting an end to impunity, all other considerations 
including legitimacy being secondary.
8
 
Even so, the inauguration of the Extraordinary African Chambers in the courts of 
Senegal (EACCS) for the trial of former Chadian President Hissène Habré on 8 
                                                          
5BBC ‘Did the ICC help Uhuru Kenyatta win Kenyan election?’ BBC News Africa 11 March 2013 
available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21739347(accessed 26 October 2013), Mehari TM ‘The 
Future of the ICC and Africa: the good, the bad and the ugly’ Aljazeera 11 October 2013 available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/10/future-icc-africa-good-bad-ugly-
20131011143130881924.html(accessed 26 October 2013). 
6Dickinson LA ‘The Promise of Hybrid Courts’ (2003)97 American Journal of International Law 301-
7, Higonnet E ‘Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice 
Reform’ 2005 Yale Law School Student Scholarship Papers 2, 13, 71, McAuliffe P ‘Hybrid Tribunals 
at Ten: How International Criminal Justice’s Golden Child became an Orphan’ 2011 Journal of 
International Law and International Relations 5. 
7See McAuliffe P (2011), Kelsall T ‘Insufficiently Hybrid: Assessing the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’ (2009)27 Law in Context. 
8
McAuliffe P (2011) 21. 
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February 2013 alludes to a continuing possibility of at least some utility in the 
concept.
9
 It also suggests that there is still room for innovation in the structure of 
future hybrid courts since the EACCS follows a different approach from that of 
previous tribunals that were typically preceded by an agreement between the United 
Nations and the state in question. In the case of Hissène Habré, several extradition 
requests made by the government of Belgium were ignored. The idea of a tribunal 
composed of Judges from both Senegal and Belgium was also rejected in favour of a 
purely African solution.
10
 
The challenge then remains to establish whether the hybrid court model per se is 
flawed and irrelevant or whether the criticisms of the operations of the existent hybrid 
tribunals relate only to the shortcomings of the specific tribunals. That being the case, 
it would be unfortunate to throw the baby out with the bath water especially if no 
better alternatives are perceived.  
1.2 Significance of the Study  
 
The ultimate goal of international criminal justice is to prevent impunity by punishing 
perpetrators so as to establish and maintain the rule of law. For this to happen, the 
victim communities must engage with the judicial institutions and perceive them as 
legitimate. Otherwise any efforts in norm penetration will be futile. The long term 
success of institutions such as the ICC depends on this perception of legitimacy. 
Considering that Africa represents the largest regional bloc of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute, the Court needs to be viewed as legitimate by Africans. The perception 
of international criminal justice on the continent of which the Rome Statute regime is 
its most prolific manifestation is therefore very crucial. Finding ways to establish and 
maintain the legitimacy of this and other international criminal justice institutions is 
urgent; given the current challenges in Africa.  
                                                          
9Human Rights Watch ‘Senegal: Hissène Habré Court  Opens’ available at 
http://www.hrw.org/habre-case (accessed 26 October 2013),Statut des Chambres africaine 
extraordinaires au sein des juridictions sénégalaises pour la poursuite des crimes internationaux 
commis au Tchaddurant la période du 7 juin 1982 au 1er décembre 1990 available at 
http://www.hrw.org/node/113271(accessed 26 October 2013)(herein after EACCS Statute). 
10See Sriram CL ‘Africa’s Pinochet’ or the beginning of ‘Africa’s Solutions’ Aljazeera  9 February 
2013 available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201329142812801421.html(accessed 26 October 
2013). 
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This research paper explores the extent to which hybrid tribunals provide a solution. 
In light of the fact that the hybrid tribunal model is constantly evolving and each new 
tribunal is distinguishable from the others, it is necessary to add to the existing 
literature on the subject. 
1.3 Research Questions  
 
The primary question that this research paper seeks to answer is: Can the hybrid court 
model improve the legitimacy of international criminal justice in Africa? In answering 
this question two sub-themes also need to be explored: 
1. Does international criminal justice face a particular legitimacy challenge in 
Africa and if so, why? 
 
2. To what extent is the hybrid court model able to foster an increased 
appreciation for international criminal justice in Africa? 
1.4 Argument of the Study 
 
The premise and thus argument of this research undertaking is that in spite of the 
enumerated failures of the extant hybrid tribunals
11
so far, such failures do not 
necessarily render the entire hybrid court model irrelevant. In this respect, one may 
argue that the challenges experienced by the operations of the various hybrid tribunals 
are unique and related more to the particular context of each tribunal and not 
necessarily to any inherent flaws in the model. In any case, critics of the model will 
be quick to admit that there are no better alternatives to fill the impunity gap left by 
the ICC’s preoccupation with only the most serious offenders in a given conflict 
situation. Hybrid tribunals are also an answer to the judicial shortcomings of post 
conflict states which render domestic prosecutions difficult or unfeasible.
12
 In support 
of the hybrid court model as a solution is the recent promulgation of the Extraordinary 
                                                          
11See e.g. de Bertodano S ‘Current Developments in Internationalised Courts’ 2003 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Linton S ‘Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in 
International Justice’ 2001 Criminal Law Reform, McAuliffe P (2011). 
12Pellet A ‘Internationalised Courts: Better than Nothing’ in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A & Kleffner 
JK (eds) Internationalised Criminal Courts Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Cambodia (2004) 437-444 at 
439. 
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African Chambers in the Courts of Senegal which proves that the hybrid court model 
is still a desirable option for the prosecution of international crimes. 
Specifically regarding the question of legitimacy, it has been postulated by some 
authors that the hybrid court model is unable to provide a viable solution to this 
challenge since concerns of legitimacy, among others, are not the primary focus of the 
establishing authorities for these tribunals.
13
Typically, hybrid tribunals have been set 
up in the past following negotiations between the United Nations and the government 
in question, and their primary concerns have often been security and putting an end to 
impunity, not legitimacy. 
It has also been suggested that such expectations of hybrid tribunals are unrealistic. 
One may argue that this is not necessarily the case especially when the unique 
challenges facing legitimacy in Africa are considered. Specifically, the African public 
often feels removed from international criminal trials and finds it difficult to identify 
with international criminal justice because the accused receive light sentences and 
wind up in comfortable conditions much better than those of the victims.
14
As such 
hybrid tribunals normally bring the trials closer to home and enable the victims to 
own the process. This has been one of the major accomplishments of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone for example
15
 and is a very good reason for a continued 
adaptation of the hybrid court model. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13McAuliffe P (2011)22, Nouwen SMH ‘Hybrid Courts: The Hybrid Category of a New Type of 
International Crimes Court’ (2006) 2 Utrecht Law Review 191. 
14See Pritchard BE ‘Congolese War Lord Gets 14 Years for Using Child Soldiers’ Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting 10 July 2012 available at http://iwpr.net/report-news/congolese-warlord-gets-14-
years-using-child-soldiers (accessed 26 October 2013), Townsend W ‘Lubanga guilty verdict will go 
beyond Ituri’ African Arguments available at http://africanarguments.org/2012/03/14/lubanga-guilty-
verdict-sends-message-that-will-be-heard-beyond-ituri-drc-by-william-townsend/ (accessed 26 October 
2013),Bueno O ‘Just Justice Civil Society, International Justice and the Search for Accountability in 
Africa’ International Refugee Rights Initiative Discussion Paper No.2 (2012)10 available at 
http://www.refugee-rights.org/Assets/PDFs/2012/StepsTowardJusticeFinal.pdf (accessed 26 October 
2013). 
15Crane D ‘Hybrid Tribunals –Internationalised National Prosecutions’ (2007)25 Penn State 
International Law Review 804. 
 
 
 
 
 16 
1.5 Literature Review 
 
Literature on the subject of hybrid tribunals is abundant, including general literature 
on the hybrid tribunal model as well as specific accounts of each tribunal.
16
The 
literature can be broadly classified in relation to the proponents and critics of the 
model.
17
 In support of hybrid courts, Dickinson
18
has argued that the hybrid court 
model is the best form of international criminal prosecutions for the future as it is able 
to promote the legitimacy of international criminal justice among the victim states as 
well as foster norm perpetration and capacity building of local judicial systems 
through the interaction of local and international judicial officers. A similar view is 
held by Higonnet
19
 who goes a step further to expound on the capacity building 
potential of hybrid tribunals especially when contrasted with the Adhoc Tribunals 
(ICTY and ICTR). However, neither of these authors or others on the subject focus 
specifically on the question of legitimacy but rather, they confine their discussion to 
the hybrid tribunal model generally
20
or else offer extensive analyses of particular 
tribunals.
21
Further still, none of them tackle the particular challenges of legitimacy in 
the African context or the potential of hybrid courts to address that challenge. 
There has also been a recent proliferation of literature on the challenges of 
international criminal justice in general
22
 as well as the specific circumstances in 
                                                          
16
See e.g. Schabas WA The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda 
and Sierra Leone (2006), Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A &Kleffner JK (2004), Jalloh CC ‘Special 
Court for Sierra Leone Achieving Justice?’(2011)32 Michigan Journal Of International Law ,Jain N 
‘Between the Scylla and Charybdis of Prosecution and Reconciliation: The Khmer Rouge Trials and 
the Promise of International Criminal Justice’(2010)20 Duke Journal of Comparative & International 
Law, Scully S ‘Judging The Successes and Failures of The Extraordinary Chambers of The Courts of 
Cambodia’ (2011) 13 Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal, Witsch MC: ‘Legitimacy on Trial at the 
Extraordinary Chambers’ (2012) 26 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal. 
17
de Bertodano S (2003), Linton S ‘Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in 
International Justice’ 2001 Criminal Law Reform, McAuliffe P (2011). 
18
Dickinson LA (2003)301-7. 
19
Higonnet E (2005) 2, 13, 71. 
20Nouwen SMH (2006), Buergenthal T ‘Proliferation of International Tribunals: Is it Good or is it 
Bad?’ (2001)14 Leiden Journal of International Law. 
21Cohen D ‘Hybrid Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia: Lessons Learned and Prospects 
for the Future’ (2007)43 Stanford Journal of International Law, Jalloh CC (2011). 
22Luban D ‘After the Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice’ 
(2013)11 Journal of International Criminal Justice, Akhavan P ‘The Rise and Fall, and Rise of 
International Criminal Justice’ (2013)11 Journal of International Criminal Justice, Schabas WA ‘The 
Banality of International Criminal Justice’ (2013)11 Journal of International Criminal Justice. 
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Africa especially with regard to the International Criminal Court
23
 and the African 
Union.
24
There is however no literature on the subject of hybrid tribunals within the 
African context. This research paper therefore adds to the existing literature in that 
regard. 
1.6 Chapter Outline of the Research Paper 
 
The discussion is broken down into five chapters. 
The first chapter provides an introduction and framework for the paper and acts as a 
road map for the rest of the discussion. Inter alia, it provides the problem statement, 
outlines the research questions and establishes the context for the discussion. It also 
presents an overview of the arguments of the paper as well as a review of the 
literature on the research area. 
Chapter two tackles the question of the legitimacy of international criminal justice. In 
particular it addresses the unique manifestations of this question in the African 
context. 
The third chapter provides a general discussion of the hybrid tribunal model and its 
potential to improve the legitimacy of international criminal justice. 
Chapter four discusses the two examples of hybrid tribunals in Africa in detail. The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts 
of Senegal are distinct in their mode of establishment and structure. By juxtaposing 
them it is possible to illuminate possible innovations for the future of the model. 
Chapter five provides some concluding observations on the author’s research. 
 
 
                                                          
23Jalloh CC ‘Africa and the International Criminal Court: Collision Course or Cooperation?’ North 
(2012)34 Carolina Central Law Review, Du Plessis M (ed) African Guide to International Criminal 
Justice (2008). 
24Ssenyonjo M‘The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International Criminal Court’s 
Investigations and Prosecutions of African Leaders’ (2013)13 International Criminal Law Review. 
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1.7 Research Methodology 
 
This research relies on a qualitative desk top research method. As such no interviews 
were conducted or data collected. Rather, extensive study of primary sources such as 
domestic and international legislation pertaining to, interalia, the establishment and 
mandates of the various extant hybrid tribunals has been done. Secondary sources 
such as the existing literature in the field of international criminal justice relating to 
hybrid courts have been studied as well. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The concept of legitimacy within the international justice context is broad and 
complex. The legitimacy of international tribunals is affected by various factors 
including those that are legal and sociological. These factors impact the way various 
international tribunals are perceived. This perception in turn affects the long term 
effectiveness of the tribunals. This chapter defines the parameters of legitimacy under 
debate in the study. It focuses on the prevailing discourse on the legitimacy of 
international criminal justice within the African context and the particular challenges 
encountered.  
2.2 Conceptualising Legitimacy 
 
International criminal justice goes beyond the traditional punitive concerns of 
criminal law to place itself within the wider transitional justice context. Ending 
impunity and rehabilitating post conflict states into functional democracies are its 
ambitious goals.
25
 These are long term concerns that require continued effort beyond 
the duration of a criminal trial and necessitate the engagement of the local population 
to set up and maintain democratic institutions such as impartial and competent 
domestic court systems. The extent to which these stakeholders identify with a 
tribunal’s processes and decisions is a key issue in the realization of each tribunal’s 
goals. Legitimacy is thus an important consideration for the success of international 
criminal justice. 
In this context legitimacy is understood as the manner in which international criminal 
courts are perceived by the key stakeholders including the victim communities and 
                                                          
25
See e.g. Preamble of the Rome Statute on the establishment of the International Criminal Court U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 17 July 1998, Luban D (2013)509, Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004) 38 
available at http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf  (accessed 26 October 2013), Galbraith J 
‘The Pace of International Criminal Trials’ (2009) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 84.  
 
 
 
 
 20 
their leaders.
26
A legitimate tribunal is one which is perceived to be effectively 
dispensing justice; fairly and impartially by those most affected by its decisions. This 
perceived or sociological legitimacy is defined in relation to the subjective views of 
international criminal tribunals by the victim communities.
27
It can be improved or 
undermined depending on the extent to which the tribunal’s procedure and judgments 
are acceptable to the various populations observing it.
28
The positive perceived 
legitimacy of international criminal courts is affected by the manner in which these 
courts are set up and run. Factors such as the process of creation, 
29
the trial procedure, 
the structure of the tribunal and the extent to which local ideas of justice are 
incorporated in the tribunal’s makeup all have an impact on its legitimacy.30Since 
these factors depend on the tribunal’s accessibility to the victim community, the 
location of the court is also an important consideration.
31
The composition of the 
court’s staff and the extent to which local presence is incorporated into its ranks also 
enables the tribunal not to seem like a foreign imposition.
32
Crucial among these 
factors is the court’s outreach efforts since it is this outreach that informs the 
community of the court’s activities and connects them to the formal justice 
process.
33
Thus, in order for international criminal tribunals to be perceived as 
legitimate, they must meet these criteria. 
Although it has been argued that perceived legitimacy is primarily affected by the 
extent to which the judgments of a tribunal resonate with the narrative of blame in the 
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community,
34
 evidence reveals that all of these factors contribute to some degree to 
the legitimacy of international tribunals in a particular context. Attempts must be 
made to the greatest extent possible to bring the international criminal justice 
mechanisms within the purview of the victim communities. 
These considerations are particularly pertinent in Africa where international criminal 
justice is often perceived as an external imposition that has little consideration for 
prevailing ideologies of justice in the region.
35
 The unflattering legacy of the ICTR 
and the controversial practice of the ICC over its first decade have also further 
alienated the region. The political rhetoric which often underscores every decision 
and judgment of the international criminal courts also encourages mistrust for 
international justice. A legitimacy gap has now been created. The following sections 
illustrate how Africa’s interaction with the ICTR and the ICC have created and 
maintained this gap. 
2.3 The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by the 
United Nations Security Council on the 8 of November 1994 to prosecute the persons 
responsible for planning and carrying out the 1994 genocide and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda committed between 1 January 
and 31 December 1994. 
36
 Its fundamental purpose is to hold individuals accountable 
for their conduct so as to ‘contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to 
the restoration and maintenance of peace. Justice should serve as the beginning of the 
end of the cycle of violence that has taken so many lives, Tutsi and Hutu, in 
Rwanda.’37 
                                                          
34
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International prosecutions were preferred because they would give the atrocities the 
global platform that was necessary to underscore the magnitude of the crimes and 
prevent future atrocities of this nature in Rwanda and elsewhere. In order to 
accomplish this task, the ICTR was given jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II.
38
 
In August 2003, the Security Council adopted a completion strategy aimed at 
dispensing with all the ICTR trials by 2008 and all appeals by 2010. Although this 
initial goal was not accomplished, the ICTR is well on its way to completing its work. 
So far out of a total of 75 cases, the ICTR has passed final judgment in 46 cases and 
completion of the others is expected in 2014 except for the Butare case which is 
expected to be completed by August of 2015.
39
 
The ICTR has made several contributions to the development of international criminal 
justice, including establishing a factual account of the genocide. It has established 
individual criminal responsibility for the perpetrators of the genocide which removes 
the stigma of group criminalisation from the community. The ICTR prosecuted 
several political, military and other leaders in the society, including 15 former 
Ministers. The most prominent defendant, Jean Kambanda, who was the Prime 
Minister of Rwanda in 1994, became one of the first, heads of government convicted 
for genocide and crimes against humanity in Africa.
40
To some extent, the Tribunal 
has also given a voice to the victim community by providing an avenue for the 
validation of their experience of suffering. Holding the perpetrators accountable on 
the international stage has also enabled the restoration of the rule of law in the 
country.
41
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(accessed 26 October 2013). 
41Gallimore T ‘The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and its 
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The ICTR has also encouraged the development of the judicial system in Rwanda 
over the course of its operations to bring it into conformity with international 
standards in order to eventually hand over the tribunal’s cases to national courts. To 
that end Rwanda has since abolished the death penalty.
42
Rwanda abolished the death 
penalty because it wanted to have genocidaires extradited and prosecuted there. 
In spite of these contributions, the ICTR has faced extensive criticism to the detriment 
of its legitimacy. Criticism from the government and people of Rwanda as well as the 
international community has plagued the Adhoc Tribunal from the moment of its 
inception to date.
43
 The government of Rwanda is one of its greatest critics in spite of 
the fact that it initiated the Tribunal’s existence by requesting the UN to help in trying 
genocide suspects. Rwanda eventually cast the only vote in the General Assembly 
against setting up the ICTR.
44
Aside from accusations of mismanagement and 
incompetence as well as some incidences of corruption in its initial stages, the ICTR 
has since been criticized for a number of reasons all of which have culminated in the 
alienation of its primary beneficiaries, the victim community.  
2.3.1 Criticisms of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda  
 
The ICTR has been primarily criticized for being slow and expensive. With over 800 
employees and a budget of over 90 million US dollars at the pinnacle of its operation, 
it diverted enormous resources that critics believe could have been better invested in 
Rwanda and perhaps devoted to rebuilding its shattered judiciary.
45
Even today as the 
Court works towards finishing its mandate its budget is still exorbitant with its annual 
budget for this year alone going to well over 170 million US dollars and it still has 
staff of over 600 employees.
46
This expense is even more pronounced when compared 
with genocide prosecutions elsewhere. For example a universal jurisdiction 
                                                          
42BBC News ‘Rwanda scraps the death penalty’ BBC News 8 June 2007 available at 
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prosecution of a Rwandan genocidaire
47
 in Canada cost just 1.3 million dollars 
whereas a comparable ICTR trial costs as much as 22.6 million dollars.
48
It is not 
surprising that one of the major reasons for the move to a hybrid tribunal approach in 
the prosecution of international crimes is because of the expense involved with the 
Adhoc Tribunals and the reluctance of the United Nations to continue shouldering the 
bulk of the cost.
49
The figures are even bleaker when compared with the cost of similar 
trials in Rwanda. 
To further compound this problem, the ICTR has been historically slow in its judicial 
process. Seven years after its establishment and more than four years since the 
beginning of the first trial, the ICTR had handed down verdicts on only nine 
individuals. The Court’s highly paid judges have been known to go as long as 28 
months at one time without hearing a substantial matter.
50
 
The ICTR has also been criticized for being physically and culturally inaccessible to 
the Rwandan people.
51
The United Nations Security Council made the decision to 
locate the tribunal in Arusha Tanzania for security reasons, among others.
52
It was 
greatly criticized by the Rwandan government, which had hoped for a court based in 
Kigali with the Rwandan judiciary playing a key role.
53
The location of the tribunal 
outside Rwanda has since continued to create and maintain a rift between the Court 
and the victim community. Genocide survivors have often found the Court to be 
foreign and unsupportive and in some cases even offensive.
54
Although the Court’s 
outreach program was developed to address this, critics believe that it was too little 
                                                          
47
R v Desire’ Munyaneza (2009) QCCS 2201. 
48Luft A ‘Canada’s First War-Crimes Trial Closes’ UNCHR Global Press Review 18 December 2008 
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too late.
55
The outreach program has been criticized for being ineffective and one-
sided to the extent that it consists mostly of information being handed down without 
any actual interaction with the communities. A better approach would be a more 
interactive and frequent engagement between the tribunal staff and the 
population.
56
This would also help the tribunal to get a sense of how it is perceived in 
Rwanda and work to improve that image.  
The fact that the ICTR has never indicted or prosecuted any member of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF)which was engaged in a civil war with the government of 
Rwanda at the time, is a serious flaw in its mechanisms and promotes accusations of 
victor’s justice.57It also supports the view that the Tutsi-led Rwandan government 
controls the Tribunal’s prosecutorial agenda for its political ends.58The legitimacy of 
the Court both internationally and among many Hutus has been affected by this.
59
 In 
2008, the ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Jallow made the decision to transfer one of its 
investigations a massacre of clergy in Kabgayi by RPF soldiers, to the Government of 
Rwanda for domestic prosecution. The result was a sham trial that ignored crucial 
evidence in an apparent attempt to shield senior RPF members from criminal 
responsibility. Despite being alerted to these shortcomings, the ICTR Prosecutor 
subsequently stated that the trial was fair and that his office did not plan to prosecute 
any other RPF cases.
60
This situation sowed the seeds for the understanding of 
international criminal justice as a tool for political manipulation rather than a 
legitimate judicial process. 
A further criticism of the ICTR has been the fact that it employs an alien system of 
justice which propagates the notion that it is a western imposition. The ICTR adopted 
the rules of procedure and evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
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Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and its judges and prosecutor have been appointed by the 
United Nations General Assembly from a list provided by the Security Council all of 
which emphasize the idea of the court as an imposition on the Rwandan people.
61
 
Additionally, the ICTR loses legitimacy in the eyes of the people because the 
punishment of the genocidaires convicted at the ICTR differs drastically from those 
convicted in Rwandan courts.
62
More than ten thousand individuals have been tried for 
genocide by national criminal courts in Rwanda and a number of the convicted 
perpetrators received the death penalty and were executed.
63
It is difficult to justify 
why the ICTR should prescribe more lenient sentences for similar crimes. The 
perpetrators prosecuted by the ICTR also wind up serving out their sentences in 
conditions far superior to those in Rwandan prisons and villages, and they have the 
detached anonymity of being away from their victims and fellow Rwandans.
64
The 
ICTR is bound to observe international standards of justice in its proceedings but this 
does nothing to improve the court’s legitimacy for the Rwandan people. 
The ICTR has often fallen short of Rwandans’ expectations of justice with regard to 
the people prosecuted and the judgments rendered by the Court. The acquittal of 
several individuals considered to be leading perpetrators of the genocide has left the 
impression that the ICTR was a betrayal.
65
For example, the acquittal of 
Zigiranyirazo
66
the brother-in-law of the late Rwandan President Habyarimana, who 
was initially found guilty by the trial chamber and Nsengimana,
67
a Catholic priest 
who was arrested in 2002 and was originally thought to have been at the center of a 
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group of Hutu extremists that carried out attacks in Nyanza in 1994, sparked 
protests.
68
 
In this light the establishment of the Gacaca Courts can be viewed as a protest to the 
imposition of the ICTR’s brand of justice. The Gacaca Courts resonated better with 
traditional conceptions of justice that prioritise family, community structure and 
reconciliation.
69
In just under eight years the Gacaca Courts tried nearly two million 
genocide suspects.
70
 The accomplishments of the Gacaca Courts in prosecuting a 
large number of perpetrators over a shorter length of time and for a fraction of the 
cost are further indictments on the effectiveness of the ICTR.
71
However, it is also true 
that the Gacaca Court structure was informal and resembled more a quasi-judicial 
body than a court of law. The relative success and expeditiousness of the process can 
probably be attributed to this absence of formal procedures and standards. 
2.4 The Practice of the International Criminal Court 
 
The International Criminal Court was set up as a permanent court with jurisdiction 
over persons for the ‘most serious crimes of international concern’, namely; genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and, potentially the crime of aggression.
72
So far 
twenty cases in eight situations have been brought before the ICC. Four of these cases 
have been the result of self-referrals by Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, the Central African Republic and Mali. The United Nations Security Council 
has also referred the situations in Darfur Sudan, and Libya both of which are not 
States Parties to the Rome Statute. Additionally, the ICC’s prosecutor opened 
investigations into the situation relating to the post-election violence in Kenya and 
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Côte d’Ivoire on the basis of his propio-motu powers.73The ICC has so far issued a 
trial judgment in one case and an acquittal in another.
74
 
 
The African region was particularly instrumental in the creation and beginning of the 
ICC’s operation.75African states contributed extensively to the preparations leading 
up to, during and after the diplomatic conference in Rome at which the Rome Statute 
of the ICC was adopted. The historic ratification of the Rome Statute by Senegal on 2 
February 1999, capped African support for the Court.
76
African States Parties ‘played 
a very important role prior to and during the establishment of the Court and perhaps, 
without Africa’s support, the Rome Statute would never have been 
adopted.’77Significantly, of the 122 current States Parties to the Rome Statute 34 are 
African States. This makes Africa the largest regional bloc of ICC membership.
78
 
 
The once cordial relationship between the African region and the ICC has since gone 
sour beginning with the African Union opposition to the arrest warrant for Sudanese 
President Omar Al Bashir
79
 in 2009 and 2010 on allegations of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide committed in Darfur. The subsequent issuance of an 
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arrest warrant for Muammar Al Gadhafi, 
80
the Libyan President at the time and finally 
the indictment and prosecution of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto,
81
 the President 
and Deputy President of Kenya, have had an adverse effect on the relationship 
between the ICC and the African Union which implies that the practice of the ICC so 
far has alienated its biggest constituency. 
2.4.1 Criticisms of the International Criminal Court 
 
The International Criminal Court has made several efforts to improve its accessibility 
to victim communities by facilitating victim participation in proceedings and 
conducting outreach in situation countries.
82
Still, the euphoria and expectations that 
surrounded the coming into force of the Rome Statute have not been realized in the 
practice of the Court to date. The Court is facing much criticism particularly centred 
on its seeming preoccupation with the prosecution of only Africans.
83
 At present all of 
the ICC’s cases so far have been of Africans and all the situations the ICC is currently 
dealing with, concern African countries. Although this is not strictly a fair assessment 
since four of the situations in question were referred to the ICC by the States 
themselves. Two other situations are the result of Security Council referrals and two 
are a result of exercise of the Prosecutor’s own discretion. This focus on Africa is 
problematic for the legitimacy of international justice in the region on several fronts. 
First, the ICC has alienated the African Union. Since the arrest warrant for the 
Sudanese President was issued by the ICC, the African Union has passed several 
resolutions demonstrating its growing disregard for the ICC,
84
 including encouraging 
member states not to cooperate in effecting the arrest warrant and even refusing the 
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setting up of a liaison office by the Court at the AU headquarters in Addis 
Ababa.
85
These have culminated in the latest decision of 12 October 2013, which 
asserts the immunity of sitting heads of state from prosecution by the ICC and urges 
the President of Kenya to refrain from appearing before the Court in the on-going 
case against him.
86
 The impasse between the AU and the Court is problematic 
because the ICC depends on the cooperation of member states for the exercise of its 
functions.
87
As is evidenced by the Bashir case which has failed to go forward since 
no African Country has effected the arrest warrant against him even though he 
regularly visits other countries that are States Parties to the Rome Statute.
88
 
Secondly, the ICC’s focus on Africa anchors the argument that it is a weapon of 
western imperialism in the region. The referral of the situations in Darfur, Sudan and 
Libya both of which are not parties to the Rome Statute by the United Nations 
Security Council, some of whose permanent members are themselves not States 
Parties, supports this view. It gives the impression that the ICC and the UNSC are 
cohorts in the service of the interests of western powers.
89
This position is emphasized 
by the fact that the Security Council referred those situations and yet has chosen to 
take some others such as the on-going conflict in Syria less seriously. The decisions 
of both the former and current chief Prosecutors to exclusively concentrate on African 
situations and to ignore the commission of international crimes in Iraq (by British 
forces), Colombia, the Comoros (by Israel’s attack on a ship registered in the Union 
of the Comoros ‘the Mavi Marmara’) and Palestine 90 when contrasted with the 
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determination to proceed with the cases from Kenya and Mali where much less harm 
was done confirms the allegations of bias.
91
This has encouraged many in Africa to 
buy into the accusations of imperialism and has led to a shift of sympathies away 
from the court to the perpetrators as has been suggested in the case of Kenya.
92
 
This state of events emphasizes the political dimension of international criminal 
justice in general and the ICC in particular. It presents the ICC as a political organ 
influenced by political considerations rather than the interests of justice in its 
decisions and practice.
93
If the primary considerations of international criminal justice 
are political then the victims are nothing but dispensable pawns. 
Aside from the ICC’s focus on Africa, the Court also faces the common legitimacy 
challenges associated with international tribunals. Inter alia, the employment of vast 
resources to try a relatively small number of people who receive lenient sentences 
compared to the ones they would receive at home including imprisonment in relative 
comfort causes it to be viewed in a negative light.
94
The first judgment of the ICC in 
the Lubanga case reflects this dilemma. Thomas Lubanga who was a notorious 
warlord in the Democratic Republic of Congo has now been sentenced to fourteen 
years imprisonment for the war crime of conscripting and enlisting child 
soldiers.
95
When this is weighed against the death and destruction that occurred and 
continues to occur in the DRC because of militias operated by Lubanga and other war 
lords, it seems like a very small price to pay.
96
Similarly in the Ugandan situation 
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where prosecution of the leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army is pending before the 
ICC,
97
 many believe that justice requires that they be tried in Uganda where there is a 
better guarantee of a heavy sentence should they be prosecuted, including perhaps the 
death sentence should they be prosecuted.
98
 
The ICC and indeed international tribunals in general also face the challenge of 
restorative versus retributive justice. In post conflict states, victim communities are 
often more concerned with restoring peace than holding people accountable through a 
criminal justice process. These expectations are then projected onto international 
tribunals that are not always able to deliver the desired outcome. In several situations, 
the ICC has been perceived negatively because of this. In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo for example, interviews with victim communities concerning their 
expectations from the ICC revealed this pattern.
99
 In Uganda as well, the initial 
support for the ICC’s involvement in prosecuting members of the Lord’s Resistance 
army eventually waned when the ICC’s indictment of Joseph Kony and other LRA 
leaders appeared to prevent the conclusion of a peace agreement between the 
government of Uganda and the rebels.
100
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The intense criticism directed at both the ICTR and the ICC reflects the volatile 
relationship that Africa has had with internal criminal justice. The resulting 
legitimacy crisis is thus comprehensible. In the end, both institutions have helped to 
cement the idea that international criminal justice is a foreign concept that is neither 
useful nor necessary in Africa. In order to alter this misconception international 
justice institutions need to adapt to ideologies of justice in the region. Proponents of 
                                                          
97
The Prosecutor v.Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen ICC-02/04-01/05 
available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/Pages/situation
%20index.aspx(accessed 26 October 2013). 
98Maseruka M ‘The ICC Should Let Uganda Try Kony-Kadaga’ The Red Pepper 13 December 2012 
available at http://www.redpepper.co.ug/icc-should-let-uganda-try-kony-kadaga/ (accessed 26 October 
2013). 
99
See Bueno O (2012)8. 
100
See Hovil L ‘A Poisoned Chalice? Local civil society and the International Criminal Court’s 
engagement in Uganda’ International Refugee Rights Initiative Discussion Paper no.1 2012 available at 
http://www.refugee-rights.org/Assets/PDFs/2012/PoisonChaliceFINAL.pdf  
 
 
 
 
 33 
the hybrid tribunal model believe that these tribunals have the ability to accomplish 
this task. The following chapters investigate the extent to which this is true. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN OVERVIEW OF HYBRID COURTS 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Hybrid tribunals are alternately referred to as internationalized criminal tribunals or 
the third generation of international prosecutions as distinct from the first generation 
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and the second generation of the Adhoc 
Tribunals (ICTR and ICTY).
101
They represent a radical move from the notion that 
purely international courts are the best way to ensure the impartiality of a fair judicial 
process that meets approved international standards.
102
 
When criminal justice is viewed as one tool in the broader arsenal of transitional 
justice measures, the vitality of engaging the local population in on-going judicial 
processes is revealed. Hybrid tribunals have been perceived as the best way to 
accomplish the goals of international criminal justice. They promise to end impunity 
while building the capacity of local judiciaries and thereby promoting the rule of 
law.
103
Usually situated at the scene of the atrocities, they foster reconciliation by 
having a cathartic effect on the victim community and promote procedural 
effectiveness.
104
Hybrid courts respond to the legitimacy challenge often posed by the 
alien nature of international criminal justice by bringing the judicial process closer to 
home and providing an avenue for the local population to engage with it. 
These advantages associated with the hybrid tribunal model have not been realised to 
expected proportions in the practice of the extant hybrid tribunals so far leading to 
criticism and a recommendation by some scholars that the model be abandoned 
altogether.
105
 This chapter provides an overview of the hybrid tribunals in existence 
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so far and the current debate relating to their utility especially with regard to 
promoting the legitimacy of international criminal justice in post conflict situations. 
3.2 The Creation of the Hybrid Courts 
 
It has been argued that the existing examples of hybrid tribunals are too distinct from 
each other to be properly assessed together as one model of international criminal 
prosecutions. Each hybrid tribunal is distinct in historic background, its manner of 
establishment and legal personality.
106
In Cambodia for example the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were the result of a long drawn out negotiation 
process between the United Nations and the Government of Co-Prime Ministers Hu 
Sen and Norodom Ranariddh from 1997.
107
 Points of contention included the fact that 
the government of Cambodia wanted to limit the level of international involvement in 
order to have more control of the process. The United Nations on the other hand was 
concerned about the effect the control of the government would have on the fairness 
and impartiality of the process.
108
A compromise was eventually reached when a 
Memorandum of Understanding was agreed on
109
 and ratified by the Cambodian 
Parliament in October 2004.
110
 
In Sierra Leone on the other hand an agreement for the Special Court was quickly 
reached between the Government and the United Nations Secretary General following 
a request by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to the Security Council.
111
The 
                                                          
106
Nouwen S (2006)194-203. 
107Etcheson C ‘The Politics of Genocide Justice in Cambodia’ in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A 
&Kleffner JK (2004)181-201. 
108
See UN Doc. GA/RES/52/135 (1997) on the establishment of a group of experts by the secretary 
general to assess the best solution for Cambodia, See Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia 
Established Pursuant to GA/52/135 UN Docs. A/53/850 and S/1999/231 at para 190 noting concern by 
the UN that more Cambodian control would compromise the fairness of the court’s process. 
109
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 
6 June 2003 available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/index.htm (accessed 26 October 
2013). 
110
Law on the Ratification of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period 
of Democratic Kampuchea and Law on Amendments to the Law on the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/index.htm(accessed 26 October 2013) 
111
See Letter from the President of Sierra Leone to the Secretary-General 12 June 2000 UN Doc. UN 
Doc. S/2000/786 annex S/RES/1315 (2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
agreement was ratified by Sierra Leone in March of that same year.
112
 Elsewhere in 
Kosovo and East Timor the hybrid tribunals were created by the United Nations 
transitional administrations
113
 in those countries and were thus under the complete 
control of the United Nations. 
In East Timor, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) established a partly internationalized institution in the capital, Dili. 
Acting under the jurisdiction of the District Court of Dili, the hybrid applied both 
international law and the hybrid laws of the UNTAET administration. The tribunal 
had both national and international judges and Special Panels were created to exercise 
jurisdiction over cases of Serious Crimes. 
114
 
In Kosovo, the possibility of a special Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court was 
considered to prosecute the cases that did not fall within the ICTY’s jurisdiction over 
only the most serious crimes
115
but was never implemented. Instead the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) adopted regulations providing for the 
involvement of international and domestic judges in the district courts of Kosovo. 
These regulations led to the creation of the Regulation 64 Panels in the courts of 
Kosovo applying a combination of international and domestic law.
116
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The Bosnian War Crimes Chamber began in March 2005 as a part of the ICTY’s 
completion strategy
117
 pursuant to a United Nations Security Council decision that the 
ICTY should complete all its trials in 2008 and all activities in 2010 and then transfer 
unfinished cases to competent national jurisdictions. An agreement between Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the High Representative established the War Crimes Chamber 
within the Bosnia judiciary.
118
 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations by Security Council Resolution 1757 of 13 May 2007. 
119
Its 
purpose is to prosecute the persons responsible for the acts of terrorism that resulted 
in the death of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri when a quantity of 
explosives was detonated close to his and other vehicles in his convoy in a street in 
Beirut on 14 February 2005.
120
The mandate of the tribunal stretches to other 
international crimes committed in relation to this assassination. 
3.3 Characteristic Features of Hybrid Courts  
 
The examples demonstrate the extent to which each hybrid tribunal is distinguishable. 
Still, enough similarities exist to point to the existence of a hybrid tribunal model. The 
hybrid tribunals discussed share several important features including the combination 
of domestic and international elements in the institutions and the applicable law. 
Foreign judges sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and 
defended by teams of local and international lawyers and at the same time, the judges 
apply domestic law that has been reformed to include international standards. 
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On one end of the spectrum is Sierra Leone where the Statute of the Special Court 
provides for appointment of the majority of the judges in the Trial and Appeals 
Chambers by the UN Secretary General and the remainder by the Sierra Leonean 
government.
121
The Registrar and the Prosecutor are also appointed by the Secretary 
General
122
and the Statute requires the Deputy Prosecutor to be Sierra Leonean. 
123
 On 
the other end of the spectrum is Cambodia’s Extraordinary Chambers where 
Cambodian judges are in the majority. The international judges are nominated by the 
UN Secretary General but must be appointed by Cambodia’s Supreme Council of the 
Magistracy.
124
 A ‘super-majority’ rule has been developed so that at least one 
international judge has to vote in favor of every decision for it to pass.
125
A 
Cambodian and an international serve as equal co-prosecutors
126
and as co-
investigating judges. The office of administration is headed by a Cambodian with an 
international deputy responsible for the international matters.
127
 
 In Kosovo according to Regulation 64, the UN Special Representative can designate 
an international prosecutor, an international investigating judge or a panel of three 
judges with at least two internationals, on the request of the prosecutor, the defense 
counsel or the accused.
128
 In East Timor the Special Panels were presided over by two 
international judges and one East Timorese judge.
129
The Deputy General Prosecutor 
for Serious Crimes had exclusive prosecutorial authority over the crimes and was an 
international
130
, assisted by nationals.
131
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon also 
allows for international and domestic judges and prosecutors to work alongside each 
other.
132
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The combination of domestic and international law is another important feature of 
hybrid courts.
133
 The documents establishing the hybrid courts in Sierra Leone, 
Cambodia and East Timor mandate the panels to directly apply both substantive 
international criminal law and substantive domestic law. In all three cases direct 
reference is made to crimes under international law and under domestic law. Thus, the 
Extraordinary Chambers Law grants the Chambers the authority to prosecute three 
specific crimes under the 1956 Penal Code of Cambodia (homicide, torture and 
religious persecution) as well as the international crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention, the destruction of cultural 
property and crimes against internationally protected persons.
134
Likewise, the Statute 
of the Special Court incorporates both international crimes (crimes against humanity, 
violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional 
Protocol II and other serious violations of humanitarian law) and crimes under Sierra 
Leonean law (offences relating to the abuse of girls and offences relating to the 
wanton destruction of property).
135
The Serious Crimes Panels in East Timor had the 
widest substantive jurisdiction over murder and sexual offences under the applicable 
Penal Code of East Timor and over most of the recognized international crimes.
136
 
Moreover, it is the only hybrid court, and the only international crimes court in 
general that claimed universal jurisdiction.
137
 
Similarly, although the hybrid panels in Kosovo and the War Crimes Chamber in 
Bosnia have jurisdiction only over crimes under domestic law, the applicable 
domestic law also incorporates international crimes. In the Kosovo courts 
international criminal law is applied indirectly, through the vehicle of pre-existing 
domestic legislation.
138
 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, legislation has been amended to 
include international crimes. Although the Special Tribunal for Lebanon provides for 
the application of Lebanese law relating to the crime of terrorism and associated 
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offences,
139
 the tribunal of necessity takes customary international criminal law into 
account. 
Hybrid tribunals share other characteristics that are not tied to their hybrid nature but 
contribute to their collective identity as a distinct mode of international criminal 
prosecution. Key among them is the location of the tribunals in the locus of the 
atrocities. This is true for all hybrids apart from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and 
the Extraordinary African Chambers in the courts of Senegal, which are located in 
The Hague and Dakar respectively. Hybrid tribunals have also shared a characteristic 
United Nations involvement in some capacity although the trend has now evolved to 
envisage other forms of regional and international cooperation as exemplified by the 
EACCS, which was established pursuant to an agreement between the African Union 
and the Government of Senegal. 
 In addition, hybrid tribunals share an adhoc nature in that they are created to respond 
to special situations.
140
They also have a similar level of financial independence from 
the United Nations in contrast to the ICTR and ICTY which were completely funded 
by the UN. Hybrid tribunals typically rely on funding from the Government in 
question and independent donations from the international community.
141
The 
distinctions between the various examples of hybrid tribunals can thus be seen as 
primarily contextual and do not negate their classification as an independent mode of 
international criminal justice. 
3.4 Hybrid Courts and Legitimacy 
 
The aim of hybrid tribunals is to marry the best of two worlds; the professional 
experience of the international community and the perceived legitimacy of local 
participation.
142
As such hybrid courts have the potential and in several cases have 
indeed improved the legitimacy of international criminal justice. 
                                                          
139
Article 2 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
140
Condorelli L &Boutruche T ‘Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Are they necessary?’ 
in Romano CPR, Nollkaemper A &Kleffner JK (2004) 427-37 at 429. 
141Ingadottir T ‘The Financing of Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ in Romano CPR, 
Nollkaemper A &Kleffner JK (2004)271-89 at 71. 
142Cockayne J ‘The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals’ (2005) 28 Fordham 
International Law Journal 616-17, Linton S (2001). 
 
 
 
 
 41 
The addition of international judges to the judicial process improves the perceived 
fairness and impartiality of the judicial process. Criminal prosecutions in a 
transitional justice context are highly political and can easily be manipulated into a 
tool to vindicate one side of the conflict to the detriment of the other. They are also 
vulnerable to biased influence by local leaders and are thus prone to unfairness.
143
This 
was especially true in Kosovo where previous domestic prosecutions were often 
considered biased by ethnic Serbs since many of the Judges were ethnic Albanians. 
Serbian judges refused to cooperate with their Albanian counterparts and the 
judgments passed by these courts were regarded as flawed. The addition of 
international judges helped to improve the image of the judicial process and promote 
wide acceptance of the judgments.
144
 
On the other hand the participation of local judges promotes local ownership of the 
process and ensures respect and sensitivity for the historical and cultural context. It 
also allows the otherwise alien international criminal justice process to be more 
accessible to the local community.
145
Aside from judges, hybrid tribunals inevitably 
hire other local judicial and non-judicial staff all of whom improve the cultural 
accessibility of the tribunal since they are more in tune with the cultural nuances of 
the society in question.
146
Conducting trials in the local language makes them 
accessible to the community. Local media, which plays a big role in influencing the 
perception of the tribunal in the society are also better placed to access the courts 
when they are situated in the victim society.
147
 
The physical location of the tribunal where the atrocities occurred is also important in 
improving legitimacy since the local population is more likely to be involved with and 
engage with the tribunal when it is physically accessible. It also enables a more 
efficient and cost effective outreach process which is an important element for the 
legitimacy of the tribunal and the perpetration of rule of law norms.
148
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The situation of the tribunals within the domestic judicial structure also has the 
potential to leave a long term impact on the capacity of the local justice 
system.
149
Although this expectation has not generally been realised it is still possible 
to envisage circumstances where international judicial officers leave some lasting 
skills with their domestic counterparts. 
The incorporation of the domestic law of the land also makes the process more 
accessible and acceptable to the community since it recognises the established 
understanding of justice in the community. It also allows local lawyers and judicial 
officers to play a leading role in the tribunal. 
The often adhoc nature of hybrids means that they can be set up as and when required 
in a particular post conflict society. They can thus be tailored to respond to the 
specific context of the conflict in question. They do not have to be constrained in 
terms of jurisdiction. In this way they maintain the advantage of the ICTR and the 
ICTY. 
3.5 Criticisms of Hybrid Courts 
 
Despite the many positive attributes of hybrid courts, they have experienced criticism 
for failing to meet the expectations of their greatest proponents. In several cases 
instead of combining the advantages of both international and domestic prosecutions 
they have exhibited the worst traits of both such as the ignorance of international 
actors of the local environment along with the weakness of the local judicial 
institutions that caused the breakdown of the State in the first place.
150
 
Where they were expected to promote legitimacy, hybrid tribunals have instead often 
been rejected by and faced extensive criticism from the local population.
151
 The 
exclusion of local participation in the design process of the courts has left a negative 
perception among the people and alienated even the most natural allies such as the 
lawyers and other elites.Local moral authorities are also explicitly excluded from the 
decision making of the tribunals. 
152
For example in East Timor the sidelining of 
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traditional healers who were respected and considered important moral authorities by 
the people was criticized. They employed traditional methods of dispute resolution 
that had worked so well in the past and which the Timorese people believed could be 
incorporated into the tribunal’s procedure. 153 The complex legal concepts and 
structures are also inaccessible to the vast majority of the population and locals are 
disappointed with the scope and pace of the court processes.
154
 
Specific hybrids have been criticized on various grounds. In East Timor for example 
the Special Panels were criticized for only prosecuting lower level perpetrators
155
 and 
ignoring the major perpetrators many of who were enjoying asylum in 
Indonesia.
156
As mentioned above, the tribunal was also criticized for not addressing 
the need for reconciliation through traditional methods of dispute resolution and the 
desire to locate missing persons which was a key concern of the Timorese 
people.
157
The absence of an outreach program was also a major flaw that seriously 
undermined the tribunal’s ability to have a lasting impact on the country.The Special 
Panels were marred with difficulty and eventually only achieved limited success 
because of poor management, lack of funding, experienced personnel, and political 
will.
158
 
In Kosovo as well, the failure of UNMIK to engage the local population in the 
process of creating the Regulation 64 panels led to a bias among the people which 
was compounded by an absence of efforts to sensitize them about the purpose and 
mandate of the panels. Many ethnic Albanians thought that the Kosovo Liberation 
Army were national heroes and resisted their prosecution.
159
As a result many of them 
boycotted the panels altogether.The hybrid experiment in Kosovo thus largely failed 
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because of a poor design compounded by an absence of funds and capacity for its 
successful implementation.
160
 
The law of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia has been criticised 
for having insufficient references to international law and for having an overly limited 
jurisdiction. This turn of events can be attributed to the difficulty of the negotiation 
process between the United Nations and the Cambodian government which led to 
major compromises on the part of the UN to the detriment of international law 
standards.
161
 Additionally the ECCC has been plagued with accusations of bias and 
corruption. According to Scully, the insufficient legal protections, limited jurisdiction, 
political interference and lack of judicial independence coupled with the bias and 
corruption that was rampant in the court reflected negatively on the court’s image and 
undermined its legitimacy.
162
 The Special Court for Sierra Leone also experienced a 
lot of criticisms which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
Many of the shortcomings of hybrid tribunals are similar to those attributed to the 
international tribunals such as the ICTR which has prompted critics of the model to 
say that they are not an improvement as such. However it is also possible to view the 
criticisms of the tribunals so far as simply kinks in the development of the model that 
need to be ironed out. 
3.6 Hybrid Courts and the International Criminal Court 
 
The prominent examples of hybrid tribunals were established before the International 
Criminal Court was operational. As such it begs the question as to what the place of 
hybrid tribunals is in relation to the Court. The ICC operates on the principle of 
complementarity which means that the court can only prosecute cases when the State 
Party having jurisdiction over the matter is unable or unwilling to do so.
163
 This 
implies that there is room for the possible co-existence of hybrid tribunals and the 
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ICC. Given that hybrid tribunals are usually established pursuant to an agreement to 
which the country concerned is a party, it is possible for the establishment of a hybrid 
tribunal to fall within a State’s obligation to prosecute international crimes. 
In any case, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to prosecuting only those most 
responsible for the commission of international crimes within its jurisdiction.
164
 This 
limited scope leaves an impunity gap that can be filled by the establishment of a 
hybrid tribunal. Although hybrid tribunals have until now also focused on the 
prosecution of perpetrators bearing the greatest responsibility, it can be argued that 
broadening the jurisdiction of future hybrid courts would be an improvement on the 
model since previous tribunals have been criticized for their limited prosecutions. 
The jurisdiction of the ICC is also limited to acts relating to state parties which occur 
after the State becomes a party. Hybrid tribunals can thus be used to fill this gap since 
they do not need to have such jurisdictional constraints.Hybrid courts can also be used 
to avoid the controversy that arises from having to wait for a Security Council referral 
for non-state parties as was the case in Libya and Darfur. A hybrid tribunal in each of 
those cases would have been a more legitimate option of seeking accountability for 
the crimes committed. 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
It is true that hybrid courts have faced similar shortcomings to the adhoc tribunals. 
However the major criticisms of the various tribunals have been related more to the 
context and practice of the specific tribunal in question. This suggests that the hybrid 
tribunal model per se is not necessarily flawed and can still be exploited to improve 
the legitimacy of international criminal justice. In Africa, where only one hybrid 
tribunal has operated so far, there is still room for the development of the model to 
suit the context of particular post conflict communities especially when consideration 
is given to the advantages of the model that allow for flexibility. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HYBRID COURTS IN AFRICA 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter places the discussion of hybrid tribunals within the African Context. The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Senegal are the two hybrid tribunals that have been established in Africa so far. 
Whereas the SCSL is in the final stages of discharging its mandate and is about to 
close, the EACCS has not yet even tried its first case. The different approaches to the 
establishment, structure and operation of these tribunals presents an interesting case 
study of the innovations that may be possible with future tribunals. 
4.2 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
4.2.1 Background   
 
In March 1991 a rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
launched an attack on the government of Sierra Leone with the help of Charles 
Taylor, President of neighbouring Liberia. This was the beginning of a war that 
spanned over a decade and ended only with the intervention of regional and 
international forces. The civil war ruined the economic, political and social 
infrastructure of the country and left a significant proportion of the population dead, 
severely injured, in exile or internally displaced not to mention acting as a trigger for 
destabilization in the wider West Africa sub region.
165
Although during the course of 
the conflict several efforts at a peaceful reconciliation of the various warring factions 
were attempted
166
 these were ultimately unsuccessful and peace was only eventually 
                                                          
165
See Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Vol 3A 
available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume3A.pdf (accessed 26 October 
2013),Pratt D ‘Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis’1999, available 
athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1999/crisis-e.htm (accessed 26 October 
2013),Akinrinade B  ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Conflict in Sierra Leone’(2001)15 Notre 
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 391. 
166
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) of 30 November 1996 available at  
 
 
 
 
 47 
returned to the country after a military intervention by British forces and the 
subsequent capture of Foday Sankoh the leader of the RUF.
167
The failure of the 
peaceful solutions sowed the seeds for a criminal justice response. The idea for a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone
168
 was born when President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah 
requested the United Nations Security Council to ‘initiate a process whereby the 
United Nations would resolve on the setting up of a special court for Sierra Leone…to 
try and bring to credible justice those members of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) and their accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the people of 
Sierra Leone….a strong and credible court that will meet the objectives of bringing 
justice and ensuring lasting peace.’169 This court would ‘meet international standards 
for the trial of criminal cases while at the same time having a mandate to administer a 
blend of international and domestic Sierra Leonean law on Sierra Leonean 
soil.’170The UNSC acknowledged this request and the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
was born following an agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the 
Secretary General of the United Nations which entered into force on 12 April 2002.
171
 
4.2.2 The Structure and Practice of the Special Court for Sierra Leone   
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up to try those bearing the greatest 
responsibility for the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law as well as crimes under the 
domestic law of Sierra Leone committed within the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 
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November  1996.
172
The SCSL is not a part of the Sierra Leone judicial structure but is 
an independent institution having primacy over the domestic courts of Sierra Leone 
with regard to the crimes within its jurisdiction.
173
 It has been described as a sui 
generis treaty-based organ which has  ‘the characteristics associated with classical 
international organizations (including legal personality; the capacity to enter into 
agreements with other international persons governed by international law; privileges 
and immunities; and an autonomous will distinct from that of its members)’.174It is 
distinct from preceding hybrid tribunals because it did not arise out of a decision by 
the UNSC
175
 and is not run by the United Nations or the government of Sierra Leone 
although both have an influence on the court.
176
 The SCSL is composed of three 
primary organs; the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry.
177
 
The Court has both judicial and non-judicial functions. For example, the Registry, 
which is responsible for administering the Court, also manages detention matters, 
negotiates the necessary agreements with states and preserves and manages access to 
the Court’s archive. The SCSL is run by a Management Committee which relies on 
donations from UN member States for its budget. Members on the Committee include 
representatives from the Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Nigeria and the Netherlands as well as representatives from the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone.
178
 
The SCSL eventually prosecuted nine individuals in four cases summarized as the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council(AFRC),
179
the Revolutionary United 
Front(RUF),
180
the Civil Defence Forces(CDF)
181
 trials and the Charles Taylor trial.
182
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The cases against Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie were withdrawn due to their 
confirmed deaths 
183
and Samuel Hinga Norman also died while in the custody of the 
court in the period between the conclusion of his case and issuance of the judgment. 
The deaths of these key perpetrators dealt a major blow to the legitimacy of the court 
and left only Charles Taylor as the major perpetrator to be tried by the court. With 
their appeals now exhausted, the eight surviving convicts from the RUF, AFRC and 
CDF trials have since been transferred to Mpanga Prison in Rwanda to serve their 
lengthy sentences. 
184
 
The Judgment in the case of Charles Taylor was a major accomplishment for the 
SCSL and was a great milestone towards the completion of its mandate. It was also 
the first time that an African head of state was brought to justice and convicted for 
international crimes. The SCSL is set to break new ground in international criminal 
justice by being the first international tribunal to complete all of its judicial 
proceedings and transition to a residual Court. The United Nations and the 
Government of Sierra Leone have agreed to establish the Residual Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (RSCSL) to carry out the judicial and administrative responsibilities of 
the SCSL after its closure.
185
 
4.2.3 Special Court for Sierra Leone: Fostering Legitimacy 
 
The SCSL is considered to be an improvement on the hybrid tribunal model in 
comparison to the preceding tribunals especially with regard to procedural 
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fairness.
186
Aside from the advantages associated with hybrid tribunals in general the 
SCSL has had a significant impact on the legitimacy of international justice in Sierra 
Leone and elsewhere. 
 
The court’s relative success in the fulfilment of its mandate has made a positive 
contribution to legitimacy. A nationwide survey in Sierra Leone and Liberia on the 
impact and legacy of the SCSL found that 79.16 per cent of people in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia believe the SCSL has accomplished its mandate to carry out prosecutions 
and restore justice, peace and the rule of law.
187
 
 
Notable among its contributions is the work of the outreach program which enabled 
Sierra Leoneans to have a relationship with the Court.
188
 The program was established 
as an office under the Registry in 2003 and is mostly staffed by Sierra Leoneans with 
a network reaching into the districts. It educates the public about the existence and 
operation of the Court and its efforts to rebuild the national judiciary.
189
Through 
activities such as town hall meetings attended by the Prosecutor and Registrar, 
production of informational booklets in Krio, Training and Trainer workshops with 
target groups such as the army, radio and television programs, video screenings, 
formation of School Human Rights and Peace Clubs, quizzes and debating 
competitions.
190
 
 
The capture and prosecution of Charles Taylor made a significant impact on the 
legitimacy of international justice. He had terrorised the region for over a decade and 
given his level of influence and powerful connections it would have been virtually 
impossible for any domestic court to put him on trial.
191
His successful conviction by 
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the SCSL therefore lends credence to the utility of an international component in the 
special court that allowed it to take advantage of additional resources in bringing him 
to justice. Anything less than a conviction of Charles Taylor would have left a 
negative impression on the overall role and success of the Court.
192
 
 
The SCSL is currently working with its Management Committee, the Government of 
Sierra Leone and the United Nations to ensure the set up and successful transition of 
its responsibilities to the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone. At the same time, 
the Court is also striving to consolidate its legacy by preserving and handing over ‘its 
intellectual assets including archives, replicable programs and jurisprudence’ to the 
Government of Sierra Leone.
193
This organised transition process is important for the 
maintenance of the legacy of the court. 
4.2.4 Criticisms of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
The decision to transfer the Charles Taylor case to the Hague
194
 dealt a serious blow 
to the legitimacy of the SCSL among Sierra Leoneans, as many wished to have closer 
and easier access to the trial.
195
His trial was the piece de resistance of the Special 
Court given the extent of his influence in the civil war.
196
It would have been very 
important for the people to witness his trial first hand and the failure of the Special 
Court to deliver this was a serious short coming. In any case the location is one of the 
key positive features of any hybrid tribunal and holding the trial in a different country 
robbed both the immediate victims of the crime and the victim community as a whole 
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and undermined the retributive and restorative elements of the trial that are 
indispensable in establishing the tribunal’s  legitimacy.197 
 
The choice of cases and in particular the CDF trial was another bone of contention for 
the Special Court. Many Sierra Leoneans viewed the CDF as a liberation movement 
and were thus biased against the court. The indictment of Samuel Hinga Norman and 
not President Kabbah who had also been part of the CDF and had in fact been 
Norman’s superior smacked of bias.198This position was emphasized by the acquittal 
of the two final accused in that case by the only Sierra Leonean judge who believed 
that ‘fighting for the restoration of democracy and constitutional legitimacy could be 
rightly perceived as an act both of patriotism and altruism, overwhelmingly 
compelling disobedience to a supranational regime of prescriptive norms’ 199  This 
dissenting view was in accord with the popular opinion of Sierra Leoneans at the 
time. In relation to this the small number of cases in itself is also a challenge to the 
Court’s legitimacy. By issuing only 13 indictments, the court failed to meet the 
expectations of the people regarding the delivery of justice for a war that spanned 
over a decade.
200
 
 
The Court has also been criticised for adapting an essentially western institution to a 
local African culture and imposing alien international law norms on the local 
population. The offences of recruiting or enlisting child soldiers and the charges of 
forced marriage were particularly criticised.
201
The charge of recruiting child soldiers 
depends upon an understanding of adulthood premised on reaching a certain 
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biological age yet adulthood in the society is rather forged in the practice of secret 
society initiation which may take place at a variety of ages.
202
A similar dilemma arose 
with regard to the offence of forced marriage which was often difficult to distinguish 
from traditional forms of marriage.
203
However given that the thirteen people who 
were actually indicted by the Court were charged on numerous offences it cannot 
really be said that these provisions biased the population against the court. 
 
Although the situation of the Court in Sierra Leone was expected to leave a powerful 
legacy by transforming the domestic legal sector, this was not the case. The Statute of 
the Court specified that the deputy Prosecutor should be a Sierra Leonean, but the 
Government of Sierra Leone chose to quietly amend the legislation and appoint a 
British QC instead which caused domestic lawyers to feel alienated from the court 
and resentful of it.
204
 Until recently Sierra Leoneans have not occupied the higher 
positions in the Office of the Prosecutor. At present only one of the Trial Chamber 
judges is Sierra Leonean and there is only one Sierra Leonean on the Appeals Bench 
as well. 
 
The initial optimism surrounding the future utility of the Court site itself has recently 
cooled. The International Centre for Transitional Justice for example at one time 
speculated that buildings, offices, computers and detention centres could all greatly 
assist a struggling and under-resourced national legal sector.
205
It is now clear however 
that the courtrooms are not really appropriate to the needs of the domestic legal sector 
and the government lacks the funds to maintain the site.
206
The building now risks 
becoming a ‘white elephant’ with its main prospect at the moment being conversion 
into a dancehall.
207
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The SCSL has also been criticised for repeating some of the major shortcomings of 
the Adhoc tribunals. Perhaps this is because its structure and legal framework align it 
more with the international tribunals than with hybrid tribunals. According to 
Schabas, the Special Court ‘is a close relative of the ‘hybrid tribunals’, but is more 
accurately classified with the ad hoc tribunals because it is a creature of international 
law, not domestic law.
208
Like the Adhoc tribunals the SCSL experienced criticism 
with regard to the duration of its trials and the expense involved and thus failed to be 
a significant improvement on their record.
209
The cost of approximately 23 million 
dollars for each trial is perhaps too high especially in the context of Sierra Leone’s 
justice system which operates on less than one million dollars each year.
210
 Thus, it is 
not surprising to hear that many Sierra Leoneans consider the overall cost of the 
SCSL too high a price to pay for what they have received in return. 
211
 
4.3 The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts of Senegal 
4.3.1 Background 
 
THE Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts of Senegal were inaugurated in 
February 2013 to prosecute the person or persons most responsible for international 
crimes committed in Chad between 1982 and 1990.
212
This hybrid tribunal was set up 
to hold former Chadian President Hissène Habré accountable for the crimes 
committed during his presidency in Chad from 1982 to 1990 when he was deposed by 
Idriss Déby Itno, the current President.
213
Habré fled to Senegal in 1990 and has been 
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(about 959 800 USD) Government of Sierra Leone, Budget Profile, Fiscal Year 2008-2010 available at 
http://www.mofed.gov.sl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=28 (accessed 26 
October 2013). 
211See Fofana U ‘Did Sierra Leone Get War Crimes Justice?’ BBC News 6 November 2009 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8345618.stm (accessed 26 October 2013). 
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Investigations of Crimes Against the Physical and Mental Integrity of Persons and their Possessions,’7 
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living in exile there since. He has until recently successfully evaded justice for his 
crimes. On 2 July 2013, Hissène Habré was charged with crimes against humanity, 
torture and war crimes and placed in pre-trial detention by the EACCS.
214
 
 
Prior to this, several attempts had been made to hold him accountable for his crimes. 
Domestic criminal proceedings accusing him of torture and crimes against humanity 
were initiated in Senegal in early 2000.The case was eventually unsuccessful and the 
charges against him were dismissed by the Dakar Appeals Court 
215
a decision then 
confirmed by the Senegalese Court of Cassation
216
 on the grounds that Senegal did 
not have legislation domesticating the offence of crimes against humanity and that the 
Code of Criminal Procedure did not give Senegalese courts jurisdiction over acts of 
torture committed by foreigners abroad. 
 
Subsequently Belgium opened investigations against Habré under its universal 
jurisdiction law culminating in the issuance, in September 2005, of an international 
arrest warrant against Habré for crimes against humanity, torture, war crimes and 
other human rights violations. Belgium then requested Senegal for his extradition. 
Extradition was denied because Habré enjoyed immunity from prosecution as a 
former Head of State.
217
Similar extradition requests in August 2011 and January 2012 
were also denied.A recommendation by the African Union asking Senegal to 
prosecute and ensure that Hissène Habré be tried ‘on behalf of Africa by a competent 
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DDS Prisons and Command Responsibility of Hissène Habré 1982-1990’ Report by Benetech’s 
Human Rights Data Analysis Group to Human Rights Watch and the Chadian Association of Victims 
of Political Repression and Crimes 3 February 2010 available at 
http://www.hrdag.org/about/chad.shtml (accessed 26 October 2013). 
214
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http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/habre-faces-war-crimes-charges-1.1540536#.Um-khVNj-18(accessed 
26 October 2013). 
215
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Senegal, Ministere Public et Francois Diouf Contre Hissène Habré (arret no 135) 4 July 2000 available 
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216
Cour de Cassation Senegal, Souleymane Guengueng et Autres Contre Hissène Habré (arret no 14) 20 
March 2001 available at 
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Senegalese court with guarantees for fair trial’ then brought the case back to Dakar.218 
 
Habré was also prosecuted in absentia in Chad for allegedly supporting a rebel 
movement opposed to the current Chadian President Idriss Deby. On 15 August 2008, 
a court in N’djamena sentenced him to death for crimes against the state.219The Court 
of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also 
became involved in the case
220
Habré brought a complaint to the Court against Senegal 
claiming that changes in the country’s legislation deliberately targeted him and were 
in violation of the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law.
221
The changes had 
been made after the African Union requested Senegal to take action against Habré. 
According to the ECOWAS court the only way Senegal could carry out the mandate 
assigned to it by the African Union was by setting up an Adhoc Tribunal ‘in 
accordance with the international custom which has emerged in similar situations.’222 
 
On 20 July 2012, the International Court of Justice found that Senegal had failed to 
meet its obligations under the Torture Convention and ordered Senegal to 
immediately prosecute or extradite Habré.
223
 These decisions prompted an agreement 
to create the Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese judicial system. 
On 17 December 2012 the Senegalese National Assembly adopted the law 
establishing the EACCS.
224
Apart from Habré the Prosecutor of the EACCS has 
requested the indictment of five further officials of Habré’s administration suspected 
of having committed international crimes.  
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222
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4.3.2 The Structure of the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts of 
Senegal 
 
The Extraordinary African Chambers have been created inside the existing Dakar 
District Court and the Appeals Court. The Chambers have four levels; an 
Investigative Chamber with four Senegalese investigative judges, an Indicting 
Chamber comprised of three Senegalese judges, a Trial Chamber and an Appeals 
Chamber.
225
 The Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber each have two Senegalese 
judges and a president from another Member State of the African Union. The 
Chamber’s Statute gives it jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and torture which were committed in Chad between 7 June 
1982 and 1 December 1990, corresponding  to the duration  of Habré’s rule.226The 
Statute also allows for the participation of victims as civil parties, represented by legal 
counsel.
227
The Chambers may also make orders for reparations to be paid into a 
victims’ fund.228 
4.3.3 Possible Contributions to Legitimacy 
 
The EACCS has an important advantage over previous hybrid tribunals which were 
established under the auspices of the United Nations. Arising from an agreement 
between the African Union and the government of Senegal places it in a position of 
greater legitimacy among Africans. It has the potential to respond effectively to the 
current challenges plaguing the legitimacy of international criminal justice in Africa 
by presenting itself as an African solution.
229
 
 
The location of the tribunal within the existing judicial structure of Senegal also 
promises to minimise the large costs usually associated with international justice 
tribunals. It also ensures that there are no issues of continuity after the tribunal 
discharges its mandate and avoids the embarrassing experience of the SCSL where 
resources were invested in building structures that don’t seem to have any use once 
                                                          
225
Article 2 EACCS Statute. 
226
Article 4-8 EACCS Statute. 
227
Article 14 EACCS Statute. 
228
Article 28 EACCS Statute. 
229
See Chapter 2.3.1 infra on the criticisms of the ICC. 
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the court finishes its work.
230
 
 
The fact that the court is in Senegal presents a picture of fairness compared to if it had 
been in Chad. The previous exparte prosecution of Hissène Habré in Chad can be 
dismissed as political posturing by the incumbent government but his present trial at 
the EACCS has the legitimacy of a fair and impartial judicial process. 
4.3.4 Preliminary Criticisms of the EACCS 
 
First, the location of the EACCS in Senegal is an inevitable result of the background 
to its establishment. It does however have the potential to impede the legitimacy of 
the trial process among the victim community. It may prove difficult to justify to the 
victims of his brutality why he is being tried in Senegal and not Chad. Serious 
outreach efforts are necessary to bridge this gap and the mandate of the tribunal to 
provide outreach should be exploited to do so.
231
 
 
Secondly, aside from the international law applicable the EACCS has the mandate to 
apply the domestic law of Senegal.
232
 This is potentially a problem since the atrocities 
over which the tribunal is presiding occurred in Chad. This may create a possible 
legitimacy gap. However this is mitigated by the fact that both Senegal and Chad are 
civil law countries thus their domestic laws are materially similar. 
 
Thirdly, the African Union and the government of Senegal have the authority to 
appoint all the judicial and administrative officials of the tribunals.
233
 This side lines 
the victim community and does not allow them to participate in the Court’s processes. 
This State of events arises out Senegal’s obligations to extradite or prosecute Habré 
but it may have the unfortunate effect of alienating the victims. As it stands the 
tribunal appears to be a project for the benefit of Senegal. It would be useful for the 
engagement and involvement of the victim community if they were better represented 
in the administration of the court. 
                                                          
230
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230
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231
Article 15(3) EACCS Statute. 
232
Article 16 & 17 EACCS Statute. 
233
Article 11, 12& 15 EACCS Statute. 
 
 
 
 
 59 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Although the Special Court for Sierra Leone made some important contributions to 
the development of international criminal justice as well as to the establishment of 
accountability and the rule of law in Sierra Leone, the criticisms experienced suggest 
a need for further improvement of the hybrid court model. The EACCS which is 
fundamentally different in structure from the SCSL and other hybrid tribunals before 
it attempts to address this issue. At this point it is too soon to tell what the impact of 
this new innovation will be on the legitimacy of international criminal justice in the 
victim community and the future utility of the hybrid tribunal model. The Court’s 
presentation as an African solution is however a refreshing change from the typical 
United Nations involvement and potentially encourages a more positive perception in 
Senegal, Chad and elsewhere in Africa. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The research has revealed that the interaction of the African region with the various 
international criminal justice institutions thus far has created a particular legitimacy 
challenge. The extensive criticism and disenchantment of the Rwandan people with 
the ICTR set the stage for a negative perception that was not dissuaded by the practice 
of the ICC. The latter court’s preoccupation with the prosecution of Africans has 
come to be its Achilles heel. 
 
 Unfortunately, the challenges and short comings of the extant hybrid tribunals have 
compromised the utility of the model. In several cases, hybrid tribunals have 
exhibited the negative characteristics of the ICTR and the ICTY. In spite of this the 
relative success and accomplishments of the Special Court for Sierra Leone for 
example continues to suggest that hybrid courts are useful tools for accountability in 
post conflict situations. The operation of the EACCS also promises to provide some 
useful insights into the future of the model. 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
Although the International Criminal Court has been criticised for its focus on Africa, 
it is also true that the region has experienced and continues to experience more civil 
unrest than any other part of the world. The greatest atrocities are often committed by 
the people in authority which means that they usually escape justice in the domestic 
courts. In other situations the conflict leaves the country in shambles and devoid of 
any judicial structure.  
Africa needs international criminal justice institutions. That said, the status quo 
cannot be maintained and new innovations are necessary to meet the dynamic needs 
of post conflict situations. The determination of the African Union to extend the 
jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ rights to cover international 
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crimes shows that there is a gap that needs to be filled. An African Union court would 
be at the regional level and just like the ICC would be removed from the victim 
communities. It does not therefore completely negate the need for hybrid tribunals to 
cater for particular post conflict situations. The hybrid tribunal model offers the 
dynamism and contextual sensitivity that the specific circumstances in post conflict 
situations require. This is why hybrid tribunals continue to be a viable option for post 
conflict justice and have been considered for several other States in transition such as 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.
234
 
5.3 Recommendation 
 
The challenges facing the legitimacy of international criminal justice in Africa are 
ultimately associated with the absence of a sense of ownership and the failure of 
international criminal tribunals to adapt to the understanding of justice in a particular 
context. These are exaggerated by the inevitable political dimensions of international 
criminal justice. Hybrid courts have the potential to address these challenges. 
However, in order for the hybrid court model to continue to be relevant as a mode of 
international criminal justice, it needs to find a place in a hierarchy where there is a 
functional international criminal court as well possible regional and sub-regional 
courts. 
Future hybrid tribunals should be closer aligned to domestic judicial systems. Focus 
on the integration of hybrid tribunals within domestic judicial systems is in line with 
the current trend for the implementation of international criminal justice which is 
implementation at the national level.
235
 Closer alignment with the domestic judicial 
system allows hybrid tribunals to capitalize on the legitimacy of national prosecutions 
while harnessing the impartiality and fairness of international processes. Although 
previous such attempts in Kosovo and Bosnia were not successful, the lessons learnt 
from those experiences can be used to improve future interactions between 
                                                          
234See Lee R ‘Plans for a Hybrid Court in Congo-Pascale Kambale’6 March 2012 Open Society 
Initiative for Southern Africa available at http://www.osisa.org/openspace/drc/plans-hybrid-court-
congo-pascale-kambale (accessed 26 October 2013), see also Wormington J & Khan T ‘Mobile Courts 
in the DRC: Lessons from Development for International Criminal Justice’ available at 
http://otjr.csls.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/178/mobile%20courts%20DRC.pdf(accessed 26 October 
2013). 
235
See Roht-Arriaza N ‘Perspectives on the Enforcement of International Criminal Law by National 
Courts’ (2013)11Journal of International Criminal Justice 537-43. 
 
 
 
 
 62 
international and domestic components within the domestic judicial structures of 
States in Africa. 
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